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When their environments change markedly, individuals and species adapt or they
cease to be. This principle holds institutionally as well as biologically. History is littered
with both discarded enterprises (such as the Children’s Crusade, the Hanseatic League, and
the Golden Horde) and successful transformations (such as the evolution of much of the
Holy Roman Empire into modern Germany).
The Internal Revenue Service now stands at the precipice of an uncertain future.
With considerable justification, the IRS considers itself as being among the most successful
revenue collection organizations in the world.1 Whether that characterization will remain
accurate in the future will depend on how the IRS deals, and is allowed to deal, with
intersecting trends threatening to cripple the ability of the IRS to perform its core mission
of revenue collection.
Part I of this article describes this intersection, which has reached crisis
proportions. 2 The workload of the IRS—both in revenue collection and especially in
adventitious missions Congress has chosen to assign to the IRS—has burgeoned in recent
decades. At the same time, the resources allocated to the IRS by successive Congresses
and Administrations—never fully adequate—have declined in inflation-adjusted terms
and, in recent years, even in nominal terms. Part I also notes the most visible
manifestations of the intersection of these trends: decreases in key IRS activities and results
almost across the board, with consequent substantial losses to the federal fisc.
Two obvious and “easy” possible fixes immediately leap to mind: (1) the IRS
should become more efficient and/or (2) Congress should appropriate more money for the
IRS. Both of these approaches have roles to play. However, Part II explains why neither
alone nor the two together can be fully satisfactory.
Theoretically, there are a number of different ways to relax the anaconda grip of
the IRS’s workload and budget squeeze. Some would require legislation. Others could be
implemented without statutory change. Part III sketches some of the alternatives. It also
notes precedents for some of them as well as obstacles to and potential disadvantages of
their adoption.
Part IV examines reasons why desirable reforms have not yet been implemented.
There are plenty of plausible ideas. Our failure to implement the best ideas results in part
from intellectual failures (clinging to policy preferences and ways of thinking that make
little sense in the current environment) but in larger part from political and bureaucratic
realities. Reforms advantageous to the country would forfeit privileges and opportunities
cherished by key congressional and executive actors.
While it would be naive to discuss tax administration without awareness of the
hampering realities, it would be unduly pessimistic to quit the field in despair.
Constellations in the political firmament are in constant motion. Changes not currently
1
Two decades ago, former Commissioner Cohen wrote: “With all of its faults, and there are many,
[the modern IRS] is still one of the best systems of administration in the world. I have gone all over the
world . . . and everywhere our system is admired. Only here is it derided.” Sheldon S. Cohen, The Erwin N.
Griswold Lecture, 14 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 113, 115 (1997). More recently, current Commissioner Koskinen
describes the IRS as “the world’s largest financial institution, [which] continues to play a pivotal role in
funding the United States government and enforcing the nation’s tax laws.” John A. Koskinen, Letter from
the Commissioner, in INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 2014, at iii.
2
Rhetorical inflation is a hallmark of our age in which events even mildly felicitous are described
as “great” or “awesome” and events only mildly inconvenient are considered to be “devastating.” The word
“crisis” drips from American lips far too cavalierly. Yet I believe it is an appropriate description of the
subject at hand. See text accompanying notes 45 to 48, infra.
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feasible may become feasible later. Recent history has shown that long-blocked changes
can suddenly become politically viable. That being so, how should the tax community
proceed? I suggest two principles. First, tax administrators, practitioners, and scholars
should continue to think and talk about the merits of ideas unhampered by the thought that
they might not be feasible. In public policy generally, and in tax policy in particular,
realities are temporary, not perpetual. We should build the intellectual case for good ideas
in preparation for the time when changing political or economic dynamics redefine the
boundaries of feasibility.
Second, bad ideas as well as good ones can suddenly emerge as serious candidates
for adoption. The tax community must be alert to these threats and respond to them rapidly
and energetically. If accepted as an excuse for inertia, the notion that it would never be
adopted may be the precursor to a professional lifetime of regret when the terrible idea,
unopposed, actually wins adoption.
I.
INTERSECTING FORCES AND CURRENT CRISIS
This Part I explores two dimensions. First, it describes the “perfect storm” that has
produced the current crisis in tax administration in the United States. Second, it charts the
consequences, the particular harms inflicted by this perfect storm.
A.
The Perfect Storm
It is often said that the mission of the IRS is to collect the revenue needed to run
the federal government, but this is imprecise. It is not the IRS’s role to wring every dollar
it can out of the citizenry by whatever means necessary, fair or foul. Instead, as the IRS
itself acknowledges:
[I]t is the duty of the Service to carry out [tax] policy by correctly applying
the laws enacted by Congress; to determine the reasonable meaning of
various [Internal Revenue] Code provisions in light of the Congressional
purpose in enacting them; and to perform this work in a fair and impartial
manner, with neither a government nor a taxpayer point of view.3
Properly executing this duty requires the IRS to balance many desiderata,
including:
•

Providing “taxpayers top quality service by helping them understand and
meet their responsibilities,”4

•

“[A]pplying the tax law with integrity and fairness to all,”5

•

Collecting “the proper amount of tax revenue at the least cost,”6

•

“[C]ontinually improving the quality of [its] products and services,”7

•

“[P]erforming in a manner warranting the highest degree of public
confidence in [the IRS’s] integrity, efficiency and fairness,”8 and

•

Being “vigorous in requiring compliance with law and . . . relentless in
[attacking] unreal tax devices and fraud.”9
3

Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689.
2002-2 C.B. ii.
5
Id.
6
1996-1 C.B. ii.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
1976-1 C.B. ii.
4
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No human institution ever achieves its goals perfectly.10 But the ability of the IRS
to achieve even satisfactory levels of performance has been put into severe question by the
confluence of three trends: (1) substantial declines in the IRS’s budget, (2) expansion of
workload in the IRS’s core revenue collection function, and (3) ever-expanding other
responsibilities placed by Congress on the IRS, that is, responsibilities not essentially
connected to revenue collection but deriving instead from non-revenue priorities. These
trends are described below.
1.
Declining Budget
We are not accustomed to the budgets of government agencies—especially key
government agencies11—declining. But the budget of the IRS has dropped, not just in real
(that is, inflation-adjusted) terms but also in nominal (stated dollar amount) terms.12
Agencies cry for greater funding more frequently than newborns cry for milk.
Sometimes agencies’ budgetary wails are valid, sometimes they are not. It is fair to say,
however, that the underfunding of the IRS is not new but is of long standing.13
What is new is the severity of budget cuts suffered recently by the IRS. In the
period 2010 to 2015, the IRS’s budget was slashed by a total of $1.2 billion, more than
17%. 14 In a joint letter to the Senate Committee on Appropriations and the House
Committee on Appropriations, seven former Commissioners of Internal Revenue stated:
“None of us ever experienced, nor are we aware of, any IRS appropriations reductions of
this magnitude over such a prolonged period of time.”15
The most recent budget, enacted in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016,16
“freezes most funding for the IRS at the fiscal year 2015 level,” although it does provide
“an additional $290 million targeted solely for taxpayer services to ensure that the agency
10
Certainly, that is true of taxation. “The wisdom of man never yet contrived a system of taxation
that operates with perfect equality.” Andrew Jackson, quoted by Peter J. Reilly, Some Presidential Words on
Federal Income Taxes, FORBES, Aug. 15, 2012, at 7, http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2012/08/15
/some-presidential-words-on-federal-income-taxes [https://perma.cc/JT6B-EH2V].
11
The critical significance of the IRS to the enterprise of governing the United States cannot be
doubted. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935) (“[T]axes are the life-blood of government, and
their prompt and certain availability an imperious need.”); see also United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440
U.S. 715, 734 (1979) (“That collection of taxes is vital to the functioning, indeed existence, of government
cannot be denied.”). The IRS collects about 93% of federal receipts. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
IRS 2016 BUDGET: IRS IS SCALING BACK ACTIVITIES AND USING BUDGET FLEXIBILITIES TO ABSORB FUNDING
CUTS 1 (2015).
12
For a chart comparing IRS funding (1) as recommended by the IRS Oversight Board, (2) as
requested by the President, and (3) as actually appropriated by Congress, all for fiscal years 2009 to 2015, see
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, REDUCED BUDGETS AND COLLECTION RESOURCES
HAVE RESULTED IN DECLINES IN TAXPAYER SERVICE, CASE CLOSURES, AND DOLLARS COLLECTED 1 (May 8,
2015).
13
“Historically, the lack of a political constituency has contributed to a level of funding for [United
States] tax administration which almost certainly is far less than optimal.” Michael C. Durst (reporter),
REPORT OF THE SECOND INVITATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE 12 (1988). I have been
beating this drum for over a decade. See Steve Johnson, The 1998 Act and the Resources Link Between Tax
Compliance and Tax Simplification, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1013 (2003).
14
Letter from Mortimer M. Caplin, Sheldon S. Cohen, Lawrence B. Gibbs, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr.,
Shirley D. Peterson, Margaret M. Richardson & Charles O. Rossotti to Senators Thad Cochran and Barbara
A. Mikulski & Representatives Harold Rogers and Nita M. Lowey (Nov. 9, 2015) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Seven Commissioners Letter]. Collectively, the seven former Commissioners served for fifty
years in Administrations of both major political parties.
15
Id.
16
H.R. 2029, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2016).
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responds to taxpayer questions in a timely manner, and to improve fraud detection and
prevention and cybersecurity.”17 However, this increase is contingent on the IRS reporting
to Congress quarterly on the IRS’s plans for the use of these funds.18 In any event, $290
million does not come close to offsetting pre-2016 IRS budget cuts.
2.
Increasing Revenue Responsibilities
The IRS’s workload in its core revenue functions has grown and will continue to
grow. First, even if the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) changed not a wit, the
population of the United States grows every year and the number of businesses in the
United States grows in most years. “[I]n real terms, [the Fiscal Year 2016 projected]
funding level is less than the IRS’s enacted level in FY 1991, 25 years ago, when there
were 38 million fewer individual taxpayers, only about half as many business tax returns,
and a far less complicated tax code.”19
Second, the Code does change—a lot.20 Every year, Congress adds numerous new
Code provisions and substantially modifies numerous existing provisions.21 Each change
requires creation or alteration of IRS forms and explanatory publications, sometimes
necessitates revised regulations or other guidance,22 and compels training or retraining of
IRS employees throughout the organization.23
Third, globalization guarantees that transnational tax enforcement and
administration will be a major and enduring part of the IRS’s future. Over a trillion dollars
a day flow across international boundaries.24 The ease with which international capital
flows can be effected guarantees that some taxpayers—both Americans and others—will
attempt to evade their tax obligations through concealed foreign arrangements. 25 In
addition, of course, legal transactions involving both inbound and outbound economic
17
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, FY 2016 OMNIBUS – FINANCIAL SERVICES APPROPRIATIONS
1 (2016), http://appropriations.house.gov/ [https://perma.cc/JMN7-NREA].
18
H.R. 2029, supra note 16, at Division E, Title I.
19
Letter from Anne Wall, Assistant Treas. Sec’y for Legislative Affairs, to Sen. Robert P. Casey, at
3 (Nov. 12, 2015) (on file with author).
20
The changes may be to either the substantive or procedural tax law. For discussion of the
demands created by the procedural changes enacted in the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and
Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998) (partially codified in scattered sections of the
Code), see Johnson, supra note 13, at 1039-44.
21
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 1, at 114-15; supra note 3; Seven Commissioners Letter, supra note
14, at 4.
22
In 1974, there were 1,500 pages in the Code compared to about 5,500 pages in 2014. In 1974,
there were about 12,100 pages of Treasury tax regulations compared to over 44,000 pages in 2014. Jonathan
H. Adler, How the IRS has Changed Since 1974, WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/04/02/how-the-irs-has-changed-since-1974/ [https://perma.cc
/XW2N-Z2DM].
23
See, e.g., Nicole Duarte, New Programs Strain IRS Resources, Budget, TAX NOTES, Jan. 3 2011,
at 63 (“Congress in 2010 enacted numerous tax law changes and new tax-related programs and enforcement
initiatives. . . . Congress’s work managed to leave the [IRS] with a potentially overwhelming slate of new
initiatives to administer.”).
24
See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare
State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1585-86 (2000) (citing studies); see also Peter D. Sutherland, Sharing the
Bounty, THE BANKER, Nov. 1998, at 16 (estimating that international capital flows exceed trade flows by 60
to 1).
25
The IRS is embroiled in a long-running effort to crack down on Americans evading U.S. taxes
through use of undisclosed foreign bank accounts. For part of the saga, see Kathryn Keneally & Charles P.
Rettig, The End of an Era: The IRS Closes in on Offshore Bank Accounts, J. TAX PRAC. & PROC., Apr.-May
2009, at 11.
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activity pose challenging transfer pricing,26 Subpart F,27 sourcing,28 foreign tax credit,29
and other tax issues.30 Often these issues involve disparities between U.S. and foreign tax
regimes or conflicting interpretations of bilateral tax treaties. 31 The United States has
responded to the challenges of cross-border tax issues through more aggressive use of IRS
summonses,32 information exchange provisions in tax treaties and agreements,33 and an
expanding array of Code provisions.34
As necessary as serious international enforcement is, one must recognize its costs.
Because of distance, political sensitivities, and the uncertainties of where principal targets
are located, overseas efforts are more time-consuming and expensive.35 A major current
initiative, the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), 36 is consuming vast
amounts of IRS resources.37
3.
Increasing Non-Revenue Responsibilities
We think of the IRS as a revenue-raising agency, but that monocular image does
not reflect current reality. A binocular view is more accurate. The IRS collects revenue,
to be sure, but it also expends a substantial part of its energy, money, and human resources
on administering a host of initiatives having no essential connection with its revenue
functions.38 For example:
The continual enactment of targeted tax provisions leaves the IRS
with responsibility for the administration of policies aimed at the
environment, conservation, green energy, manufacturing, innovation,
education, saving, retirement, health care, child care, welfare, corporate
governance, export promotion, charitable giving, governance of tax
exempt organizations, and economic development, to name a few.39
26

I.R.C. § 482.
I.R.C. §§ 951-964.
28
I.R.C. §§ 861-865.
29
I.R.C. §§ 901-909.
30
See, e.g., Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REV. 259
(2003); Diane M. Ring, One Nation Among Many: Policy Implications of Cross-Border Arbitrage, 44 B.C. L.
REV. 79 (2002).
31
See, e.g., S. Rep. 445, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. XII H1, Technical Corrections to the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 (discussing the relationship between U.S. tax treaties and the Code).
32
See, e.g., United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1119 (1983), further proceedings, 722 F.2d 657 (11th Cir. 1983), appeal after remand, 740 F.2d 817
(11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985).
33
For example, Article 26 of the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty provides for exchange of
information and administrative assistance between the IRS and the treaty partner’s tax authority. The United
States has tax treaties of varying degrees of coverage with approximately 70 other countries.
34
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 982 (formal document requests), 6038A (information as to certain foreignowned corporations) & 6038C (information with respect to foreign corporations engaged in U.S. business).
For discussion of these and other devices, see JOHN A. TOWNSEND, LARRY A. CAMPAGNA, STEVE JOHNSON &
SCOTT A. SCHUMACHER, TAX CRIMES 327-30 (2d ed. 2015).
35
See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State Circular, Obtaining Evidence Abroad, 739 PLI/LIT 1095, 1098
(2006).
36
Pub. L. No. 111-147, 124 Stat. 71, 97 (codified at IRC §§ 1471 et seq.).
37
See, e.g., Seven Commissioners Letter, supra note 14, at 3.
38
See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 DUKE L.J. 1717
(2014).
39
Pamela F. Olson, Woodworth Memorial Lecture: And Then Cnut Told Regan . . . Lessons from
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 38 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (2011) (citations omitted); see also Lawrence B.
Gibbs, Loving v. IRS: Treasury’s Authority to Regulate Tax Return Preparers, TAX NOTES, Oct. 21, 2013, at
331, 334 (“One of the biggest changes in the Federal tax area in the last twenty-five years has been the
27
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The IRS has been charged with vast additional burdens of rulemaking, information
processing, and enforcement with respect to the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), enacted in
2010.40 This program “contains an extensive array of tax law changes that, absent added
funding, will present budgetary challenges for the IRS in the coming years.”41
It is now more accurate than alarmist to warn that “Congress’s repeated utilization
of the IRS to serve functions beyond its traditional revenue raising mission has reached a
tipping point that threatens to undermine substantially the viability of the IRS’s primary
mission as the nation’s tax collector.”42
4.
Cumulative Impact
Could the IRS meet its revenue-collection responsibilities without significantly
enhanced funding? Probably yes—if it were able to shed its non-revenue functions. Could
the IRS shoulder both its revenue duties and its currently assigned adventitious duties?
There would be agency expertise, organization, and institutional culture concerns, but
probably yes—if Congress were to greatly increase funding for the IRS.
The problem is the simultaneity and compounding effects of the three trends.
According to former Commissioners, “these reductions in IRS appropriations are difficult
to understand in light of the fact that, at the same time these reductions have occurred, the
Congress repeatedly has passed major tax legislation to substantially increase the IRS
workload.”43 Commissioner Koskinen offered this example: “The disconnect between our
funding levels and our responsibilities is illustrated by the fact that, just three days after
cutting our budget by almost $350 million, Congress passed legislation requiring the IRS
to design and implement two new programs by [a designated date].”44
B.
Consequences
The “terrible trifecta” described above sounds ominous, but is it really? What, if
any, have been the particular, adverse repercussions of the current trends?
Seven former Commissioners of Internal Revenue have said that currently “the
IRS is stretched to the breaking point to cope with tax enforcement challenges attributable
to global and domestic changes that are impacting our tax system.” 45 The current
Commissioner has warned that “now, we are at the point of having to make very critical

increasing number of socio-economic spending programs that have been run through the Internal Revenue
Code.”).
40
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the United States Code), amended by the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
41
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, IMPLEMENTATION OF FISCAL YEAR
2013 SEQUESTRATION BUDGET REDUCTIONS 5 (June 12, 2014); see also Letter from Representatives Jason
Chaffetz, Jim Jordan & Mark Meadows to John Koskinen (Jan. 29, 2014) (on file with author); William
Hoffman, IRS May Miss 12 Million Taxpayer Calls in 2015, TAX NOTES, June 16, 2014, at 1263, 1264
(according to John Dalrymple, IRS Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement, the IRS anticipated
receiving 11 million calls in 2015 from taxpayers confused by ACA provisions) (“This is complicated
stuff. . . . [It] is complicated for us; it’s complicated for taxpayers.”).
42
Kristin E. Hickman, Pursuing a Single Mission (or Something Closer to It) for the IRS, 7 COLUM.
J. TAX L. 169, 173 (2016).
43
Seven Commissioners Letter, supra note 14, at 3.
44
Prepared remarks of John A. Koskinen, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, before the Tax
Executives Inst. 65th Mid-Year Conference 4 (Washington, D.C.) (Mar. 24, 2015) (on file with author).
45
Id.
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performance tradeoffs”46 and has stated, “I am deeply concerned about the ability of the
IRS to continue to fulfill its mission if the agency lacks adequate funding.”47 Another
Treasury official echoed: “This reduced funding has directly led to deterioration in the
ability of the IRS to conduct its mission . . . . A sustained deterioration in taxpayer services
combined with reduced enforcement activity creates serious long-term risk for the U.S. tax
system.”48
But, of course, “the sky is falling” rhetoric is central to the playbook of
administrative agencies trying to defend or enhance their budgets. With how large a pinch
of salt, then, should we take the above dire assessments?
Seven dimensions suggest that the Commissioners’ concerns should not be
dismissed out of hand. They involve (1) formal guidance, (2) informal guidance, (3)
enforcement, (4) workforce, (5) training, (6) technology, and (7) revenue.
1.
Formal Guidance
Treasury and the IRS provide critical guidance to taxpayers through both force-oflaw regulations and a variety of guidance documents, such as revenue rulings, revenue
procedures, notices, announcements, and private letter rulings.49 Resource constraints in
recent years have caused the IRS to delay or abandon important regulation projects50 and
to scale back substantially its issuance of revenue rulings51 and private letter rulings.52
This contraction may well continue.
Relating to legal guidance, [the IRS has] had to limit what [it] can do on
business tax issues, and guidance needed for specialized areas may suffer
as a result . . . . [I]t should be clear to everyone that Chief Counsel’s Office
will have to reprioritize projects as it continues to lose staff. [Chief
Counsel is] down about 200 attorneys since 2009.53

46
Written Testimony of Commissioner John A. Koskinen before Senate Finance Comm. on IRS
Budget & Current Operations 3 (Feb. 3, 2015).
47
Written Testimony of Commissioner John A. Koskinen before House Oversight and Government
Reform Comm. on IRS Operations 1-2 (Mar. 26, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/WrittenTestimony-of-Commissioner-Koskinen-before-the-House-Oversight-and-Government-Reform-Committeeon-IRS-Operations.
48
Letter from Anne Wall, Treas. Assistant Sec’y for Legislative Affairs, to Sen. Michael B. Enzi 2
(Aug. 19, 2015) (on file with author).
49
For discussion of these and other types of IRS guidance, see STEVE JOHNSON, JEROME BORISON &
SAMUEL ULLMAN, CIVIL TAX PROCEDURE ch. 1 (3d ed. forthcoming 2016).
50
See, e.g., Alison Bennett, Foreign Tax Credit Splitter Rules Slowed by Resource Constraints, IRS
Official Says, 33 TAX MGMT. WKLY. REP. 1696 (Dec. 11, 2014); Lydia Beyoud, Staffing Declines in
Passthroughs Division Likely to Result in Smaller Guidance Plan, 33 TAX MGMT. WKLY. REP. 694 (May 16,
2014).
51
IRS issued 636 revenue rulings in 1974, but only 50 in 2013. See Adler, supra note 22. The
slack was partly taken up by issuance of more notices, although notices typically receive somewhat less
exacting review. In the early 1980s, the IRS issued between 200 and 400 revenue rulings, but only 10 to 20
notices each year. Recently, the IRS has been issuing around 50 revenue rulings, but around 100 notices each
year. The IRS considers notices to be on the same plane of authority as revenue rulings. Rev. Rul. 90-91,
1990-2 C.B. 262. Courts, however, seem to give notices less weight. See, e.g., BMC Software, Inc. v.
Comm’r, 780 F.3d 669, 675-76 (5th Cir. 2015); Costantino v. TRW, Inc., 13 F.3d 969, 980-81 (6th Cir. 1994)
(both refusing to defer to IRS notices).
52
The IRS issued about 14,000 private letter rulings in 1974 but fewer than 2600 in 2013. Id. See
also Rev. Proc. 2003-48, 2003-2 C.B. 86 (adding “business purpose” to the list of topics on which the IRS
will not rule).
53
Koskinen, supra note 44, at 4-5.
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2.
Informal Guidance
According to Ken Armstrong, “the reduction in IRS toll-free phone lines, walk-in
Taxpayer Assistance Centers . . . in all areas of taxpayer correspondence, and a decrease in
its workforce along with reductions in training and information technology have
significantly diminished service to taxpayers.” 54 In Fiscal Year 2013, only 61% of
taxpayers seeking to reach an IRS customer service representative by telephone got
through, down from 87% in Fiscal Year 2004.55 By 2015, the figure dropped to under
50%. 56 Almost 20 million phone calls from taxpayers to the IRS went unanswered in
2013.57
Those that did get through had long wait times, [which] rose from
12.8 minutes in 2013 to 20.3 minutes during the first four months of
2014. . . .
Those expecting correspondence did not fare better. During 2013,
the IRS was unable to process 53 percent of its adjustments
correspondence within 45 days, its standard timeframe.58
The Practitioner Priority Service used to be a popular device by which taxpayers’
representatives could obtain information on an expedited basis. But “[t]he PPS level of
service has been frustrating to say the least. Many [enrolled agents] report frequently
receiving messages that due to high volume, IRS cannot accept their calls and others have
waited hours for service.”59
As always, of course, one must ask whether the numbers tell the whole story. A
standard ploy in the strategy of agencies conducting guerrilla warfare against budget cuts
is to cut good—or at least visible and popular—programs rather than wasteful ones, that
is, to pare muscle rather than fat, as a way of leveraging howls of constituent indignation
into restoration of funding. One cannot say with certainty whether and to what extent the
IRS has slashed taxpayer service rather than other activities as part of such a strategy, but
the possibility exists.60
3.
Enforcement
No one knows for sure how much tax that should have been paid goes uncollected.
The IRS estimates that the annual tax gap—the difference between what taxpayers should
have paid and what they paid timely—is $450 billion. The largest component ($376
billion) reflects taxpayers underreporting their liabilities on their returns. An additional
54

Ken Armstrong, Service Matters, 33 TAX MGMT. WKLY. REP. 1646 (2014); see also National
Taxpayer Advocate, 2013 Annual Report to Congress (Dec. 31, 2013).
55
Catherine Rampell, Charting the Decline in Service at the IRS, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2014),
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2014/01/ny-times-2.html [https://perma.cc/M22W-BED3].
56
Koskinen, supra note 44, at 3. During the 2015 filing season, “the IRS answered only 38 percent
of calls and those taxpayers able to reach the IRS experienced average wait times of over 23 minutes.” Wall,
supra note 19, at 2.
57
National Treasury Employees Union, Press Release, June 17, 2014, at 2 (on file with author).
58
Id.
59
Letter from Lonnie Garry, President of Nat’l Ass’n of Enrolled Agents, to Commissioner John A.
Koskinen, Sept. 18, 2014 (on file with author). The average wait was 32.5 minutes. NTEU Press Release,
supra note 57, at 2.
60
The IRS has told Congress that “the only way to address these issues [of the impact of budget
cuts on the quality of taxpayer services] is for Congress to provide the IRS with the additional funding.”
Wall, supra note 19, at 1. Well, maybe not. The IRS has considerable, though not unlimited, flexibility in
how it allocates appropriated funds and splits funds among activities. See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, supra note 11, at 5-6.
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$28 billion is based on taxpayers who are legally obligated to, but do not, file returns. The
remaining $46 billion consists of reported but unpaid tax liabilities.61 In short, there are
abundant targets for more robust tax enforcement.
Yet key enforcement activities have contracted, not expanded, in recent years.
Overall, between 2010 and 2015, IRS enforcement dropped by 20%.62 For example:
•

As noted in Subpart I.A. above, information gathering and enforcement
involving transnational activities are of great and growing importance.
FATCA is a central strategy for reducing cross-border evasion of U.S.
taxes. The IRS has enough resources to accept the tsunamis of forms and
reports that FATCA requires—but perhaps not enough to actually read,
process, and act on the information contained in the FATCA reports.63

•

Similarly, to facilitate cross-border enforcement, the IRS has long
stationed employees in key global commerce hubs, but, for budgetary
reasons, the IRS has closed its offices in Beijing, London, Paris, and
Frankfurt.64

•

In 2014, the IRS performed 100,000 fewer examinations of individual
taxpayers, dropping individual audit coverage rates to historic lows.65

•

The Appeals Office is a critical part of the IRS because it resolves
numerous cases that otherwise would have to be docketed for trial.
Because of budget cuts, however, some cases now are handled by offices
remote from the taxpayer’s residence, without face-to-face contact, and
less expeditiously.66

In Fiscal Year 2013, “[c]ollection activities initiated by the IRS, such as
taxpayer liens, levies, and property seizures, declined by approximately 33
percent.”67
4.
Workforce
Like most organizations, the IRS’s biggest expense is compensation of its
employees. This is hardly surprising. “In order to perform the Service’s critical functions,
in the face of complex and constantly changing tax laws, a sufficient staff must be recruited
and properly trained.”68
Yet the IRS has “been forced to significantly reduce the size of its workforce. . . .
Between FY 2010 and the end of FY 2014, the number of IRS employees has been reduced
•

61
62

TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, supra note 12, at 2 & n.3.
House Approves Broad Spending Plan with Cuts to IRS, 33 TAX MGMT. WKLY. REP. 1695 (Dec.

11, 2014).

63

Jennifer DePaul, Koskinen Says Budget Cuts Affect FATCA Administration, TAX NOTES, at 1408
(Mar. 31, 2014).
64
IRS Statement, Jan. 14, 2015 (on file with author).
65
Written Testimony of Commissioner John A. Koskinen, Internal Revenue Service, Before the
House Ways and Means Comm., Subcomm. on Oversight, The 2014 Filing Season and Improper Payments
(May 7, 2014) (on file with author).
66
See, e.g., Letter from Michael Hirschfeld, Chair of the American Bar Ass’n Section of Taxation,
to Senators Tom Udall and Mike Johanns & Representatives Ander Crenshaw and Jose E. Serrano (July 21,
2014) (on file with author) (“The ability of taxpayers to resolve cases administratively has also been
negatively affected by decreased funding”).
67
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, supra note 12, at 2.
68
Hirschfeld, supra note 66, at 3.
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by approximately 13,000 full-time positions, with about 9,500 coming from front-line
enforcement personnel.”69
Demographic trends make these losses particularly difficult to absorb.
[They] come at a time when the IRS workforce is aging, with nearly 52%
of IRS employees now over the age of 50 and 24% already eligible to
retire. Three years from now, 38% of IRS employees will be eligible to
retire. This loss of IRS knowledge and experience is alarming, particularly
in light of the fact that, out of a present workforce of about 85,000
employees, the IRS has only about 3,400 employees under the age of 30
70
and only 384 employees under the age of 25 . . . .
5.
Training
Having a large workforce will not suffice (and indeed may create more problems
than it solves) if employees lack relevant knowledge. Knowledge may come from
experience or from training. Yet many of the IRS’s most senior personnel are choosing
retirement, 71 and the IRS has suffered “dramatic curtailments in training, travel, office
space, and outside contracts.” 72 This country’s tax laws have not become 85% less
complicated.73 Yet, between 2009 and 2014, the IRS’s training budget was slashed by
85%.74
6.
Technology
Each year, the IRS processes around 145 million tax returns, issues over 100
million refunds, 75 makes hundreds of millions of assessments, and generates untold
millions of audit letters, collection letters, notices, bills, and other correspondence. To
operate effectively, the IRS needs efficient and reliable information systems.
However, as a result of its own poor performance as well as lean budgets,76 the
IRS is forced to rely on aging, outmoded IT systems that sometimes do not interface with
each other.77 Inadequate technology also imperils the IRS’s ability to effectively execute
69
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, supra note 12, at 2. The seven
former Commissioners put this attrition at 15,000. See Seven Commissioners Letter, supra note 14, at 2.
The workforce of the IRS’s Criminal Investigation Division has dropped to its lowest level in four decades.
See Exclusive: IRS Enforcement Agent Numbers Could Drop to Lowest Levels Since 1970s, REUTERS (Aug
25, 2014), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/exclusive-irs-enforcement-agent-numbers-111711058.html [https://
perma.cc/YA2G-ZEMA].
70
Seven Commissioners Letter, supra note 14, at 2-3. John Dalrymple, IRS Deputy Commissioner
for Services and Enforcement, described the ongoing “brain drain” of retiring IRS employees as “a real
critical problem.” Quoted by Hoffman, supra note 41, at 1264; see also Duarte, supra note 23, at 63
(“[E]xperienced IRS staff, and especially managers, are in short supply.”).
71
Hirschfeld, supra note 66, at 3.
72
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, supra note 12.
73
Indeed, “Congress almost annually over the last 25 years has passed legislation that has imposed
additional burdens on IRS tax collection and administration.” Seven Commissioners Letter, supra note 14, at
4.
74
Written Statement of Nina E. Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate, Hearing on Identity TheftRelated Tax Fraud, Before the House Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcomm. on
Government Operations 4 (Aug. 2, 2013).
75
Wall, supra note 19, at 2 (citing information from the National Taxpayer Advocate).
76
See Armstrong, supra note 54 (“Throwing money at IT and staffing won’t solve the impending
. . . administration burdens on the IRS unless it has direction.”).
77
Wall, supra note 19, at 2; Duarte, supra note 23, at 63; see also Koskinen, supra note 44, at 4
([The IRS is] “experiencing delays to critical IT projects, with very old technology running alongside more
modern systems.”).
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the non-revenue functions Congress has chosen to vest in the IRS. For example, “without
proper technology and staffing, the [ACA] reporting and funding system is doomed to
failure.”78
The threat is not just to the IRS. It potentially implicates the peace and financial
security of most of the adult population of the United States: the Americans who deal with
the IRS. Combatting tax-based identity theft and fraud is a major goal of the IRS.79 In
2015, there were unauthorized attempts to access taxpayer information using the agency’s
“Get Transcript” online application.80 This was the most publicized incident but far from
the only one. “[T]he IRS continues to experience about one million attempts each week to
hack into its main information technology system. Although the IRS has so far successfully
thwarted these attacks, [they emphasize] that the IRS taxpayer assistance and IRS
information technology resources are severely underfunded.”81
7.
Revenue
Viewed from the traditional perspective, raising revenue—the correct amount of
revenue determined by Congress—is the central criterion on which IRS performance
should be evaluated. The “perfect storm” intersection of trends described above has eroded
the IRS’s ability to collect tax liabilities and threatens more damage in the future.
Supporters of the IRS find it ironic that Congress has reduced funding for the main
federal agency that actually turns a profit. The rule-of-thumb statistic is “that for every $1
invested in the IRS budget, it produces $4 in enforcement revenue, which is a $4-to-$1
return on investment.”82 Accordingly, the IRS estimates that, for 2014, “it would have
returned to the Federal government over $2 billion more in collections had we received the
remaining $500 million that our budget was cut as a result of the sequester.”83
The 4-to-1 ratio is neither a ceiling nor a floor. Everything depends upon the
particular use to which the IRS will put additional funds, which may explain why the IRS
sometimes offers different return-on-investment figures.84 Some in Congress, however,

78

Armstrong, supra note 54.
See, e.g., Prepared Remarks of Commissioner of Internal Revenue John Koskinen, Before the
National Press Club 7 (Apr. 2, 2014).
80
See, e.g., Michael S. Schmidt, Hacking of Tax Returns More Extensive than First Reported IRS
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/us/politics/hacking-of-tax-returnsmore-extensive-than-first-reported-irs-says.html [https://perma.cc/VVE5-7YTT ] (“[H]ackers had gained
access to the tax returns of more than 300,000 people, a far higher number than the agency had reported
previously.”).
81
Seven Commissioners Letter, supra note 14, at 4.
82
Written Testimony of Commissioner John A. Koskinen, Internal Revenue Service, Before the
Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government on the FY 2015 IRS Budget 11 (Apr. 7, 2014).
83
Id. See also Written Testimony of John A. Koskinen, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service,
Before the House Ways and Means Comm., Subcomm. on Oversight, The 2014 Filing Season and Improper
Payments 5 (May 7, 2014) (estimating a revenue loss of almost $3 billion). The 4 to 1 ratio was derived by
dividing the additional revenue brought in by the IRS as a result of enforcement activities by the IRS’s
budget. Thus, in Fiscal Year 2013, IRS enforcement collected about $53 billion from a budget of about $12
billion, a rate of return somewhat over 4 to 1. See id. at 1-2.
84
E.g., John Koskinen, Commissioner’s Message on the Budget 2 (Feb. 2, 2015) (“For every dollar
invested in these programs, there can be returns ranging from 6-to-1 and even up to 20-to-1 for some
initiatives”); John Koskinen, quoted by Senator Ron Wyden, Statement on Budget Challenges 2 (Jan. 14,
2015) (7 to 1).
79
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have lost faith in these oft-repeated figures, and it may be the path of wisdom to eschew
precise quantification.85
The other possible effect is more subtle and conjectural but—were it to come to
fruition—would be even more grave. The IRS examines only a small percentage of returns
filed, typically under one percent.86 At such low coverage, it is essential that the returns
taxpayers file bear some reasonable correlation to economic reality.87
What causes taxpayers to comply or not comply with the tax laws is a complex
web of self-interest, social signal, and personal morality.88 Even a gradual deterioration of
compliance would be dangerous.89 Each 1% drop in compliance costs the federal treasury
about $30 billion annually.90
The “tipping point” theory posits that a point can be reached at which taxpayer
alienation from the system or taxpayer disdain for tax enforcement becomes so pervasive
that a general culture of tax compliance could flip “virtually overnight” into a general
culture of noncompliance.91 Some fear we are at, or near, that point now.92 I do not share
that fear, but the magnitude of the stakes inspires caution. Commissioner Koskinen has
warned that the budget-driven “erosion in audit coverage . . . is deeply worrisome . . .
especially for a system like ours that depends on voluntary compliance.”93
II.
DOUBTING OBVIOUS SOLUTIONS
In an increasingly complicated and thoroughly politicized society, few things are
more treasured by Americans than simplistic explanations that allow us to keep, indeed
fortify, our preconceptions. The woes of the IRS have been on the radar screen of public
discourse long enough that two camps have formed as to what the appropriate solution to
them might be.
Committed members of both camps may have the same reaction—although for
quite different reasons. The common reaction may be “there’s no need to overthink this.
There’s a pretty easy answer to the perfect storm problem.” For those in the anti-IRS camp,
85

See, e.g., Hirschfeld, supra note 66, at 3 (stating simply that IRS enforcement produces “a
substantial increase” in collections and that reduced funding may yield “significantly lower tax collections”);
see also National Taxpayer Advocate, 2013 Annual Report to Congress, Executive Summary 21 (Dec. 31,
2013).
86
In Fiscal Year 2014, for example, the IRS examined seven tenths of one percent of all returns
filed. IRS Data Book tbl. 9a (2014).
87
Such “self-assessment” is the bedrock of our system of taxation. See, e.g., United States v.
Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 683 (1983); IRS Proc. Reg. § 601.103(a) (2009).
88
The literature on tax compliance is immense. See, e.g., Robert Boylan, Richard J. Cebula,
Maggie Foley & Douglass Izard, Implications of Recent Federal Personal Income Tax Increases for Income
Tax Evasion, Tax Revenues, and Budget Deficits, 6 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 1 (2014); Sarah B. Lawsky,
Modeling Uncertainty in Tax Law, 65 STAN. L. REV. 241 (2013); Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between
Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L. J. 1453 (2003); J. Manhire, Toward a
Perspective-Dependent Theory of Audit Probability for Tax Compliance Models, 33 VA. TAX REV. 629
(2014).
89
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 1, at 117 (“The audit rate in 1964-68 was about 4.5 to 5 percent,
compliance was over 90 percent; today the audit rate is less than one percent and compliance is only about 80
percent. Think there is a correlation? I do.”).
90
John Koskinen, quoted by William Hoffman, Koskinen Warns of House IRS Budget Impact in
2015, TAX NOTES, at 919 (Aug. 25, 2014).
91
See Eric Kroh, U.S. Seen as in Danger of Tumbling Over “Compliance Cliff”, TAX NOTES, at
909 (Aug. 25, 2014) (quoting Richard Lavoie).
92
See Jeremy Scott, The Precarious State of Voluntary Compliance, TAX NOTES, at 893 (Aug. 25,
2014).
93
Koskinen, supra note 44, at 5.
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the easy answer might be “despite budget cuts, the IRS still has a big budget. It just has to
use it better by prioritizing and becoming more efficient.” For those in the pro-IRS camp,
the easy answer might be “just open the purse strings. Congress should give the IRS the
budget it needs.”
There is a kernel of truth in both of these views. Neither simplistic approach can
provide the full answer, however. The anti-IRS agenda lacks flexibility: most easy
efficiencies already have been wrung out of the system. The pro-IRS agenda could
perpetuate bad behavior: the agency’s recent woes reflect serious management failures, as
well as budgetary and workload pressures. To open wide the appropriations spigot would
remove pressures and incentives for constructive change within the agency. This is not to
suggest that the IRS be put on a budgetary starvation diet, but rather to suggest that the
“just throw more money at it” approach which is often preferred in this country would be
shortsighted in this context.
A.
“Just Become More Efficient”
Recent budget and workload stresses have caused the IRS to improve its efficiency
in a number of ways.94 No doubt, some additional opportunities for efficiencies exist, but
there are practical limits. No organization of 85,000 (or even fewer) participants—whether
public or private—has yet or ever will achieve perfect efficiency. It flouts experience to
demand that which has never been attained. The seven former commissioners observed:
Some have argued that the IRS can solve these problems by
simply becoming more efficient. This argument ignores the reality that
the IRS is already, by far, the most efficient tax collection agency among
large countries in the world. . . . [T]he amount the IRS spends to collect a
dollar in taxes is approximately half the average amount spent by all
OECD countries. Germany, France, England, Canada and Australia all
spend as much as two or three times the amount the IRS does to collect a
dollar of revenue.95
B.
“Just Give the IRS More Money”
In light of the harms described in Part I of this article one might, at first glance, be
deeply puzzled as to why Congress has been decreasing the IRS’s budget. This behavior
could seem extremely short-sighted, the government “cutting off its nose to spite its face.”
Writing to the chairs and ranking members of Congress’s principal tax-writing committees,
seven former commissioners of the IRS remarked with evident exasperation:
[W]e fail to understand how it makes any logical sense to continue to
reduce, rather than increase, the IRS budget . . . . [W]e do not understand
why anyone with present and projected debts and annual losses as large as
94

“The IRS does need to be as efficient as possible and we now saved over $200 million a year as a
result of efficiencies instituted over the past few years.” Koskinen, supra note 44, at 4. The commissioner
added: “But we’re now at a point where further cuts may make us seem more efficient, but we’re actually
going to be a lot less effective.” Id. For details as to recent efficiencies, see Written Testimony of John A.
Koskinen, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, Before the Senate Finance Committee, IRS Budget and
Current Operations 3 (Feb. 3, 2015) (describing real estate management, printing, postage, and other
reforms).
95
Seven Commissioners Letter, supra note 14, at 5 (citing the 2013 biannual comparative analysis
of tax administration by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development); see also John
Koskinen, quoted by William Hoffman, Koskinen Warns of House IRS Budget’s Impact in 2015, TAX NOTES,
at 919-20 (Aug. 25, 2014) (“We’re beyond the stage where we can pretend we can keep doing the same
amount of work with less resources”).
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those of the United States would refuse to pay for telephone assistance to
people trying to fulfill their tax obligations, would turn their back on $8
billion annually in additional revenue, or would fail to make an investment
that offers a return equal to at least four times the amount invested. For
those reasons, we respectfully call upon each of you to support and work
to accomplish the passage of [significantly enhanced] IRS
appropriations.96
Anyone who cares about good tax administration will understand the former
commissioners’ view, but there is another side of the story. The IRS has had a string of
embarrassing, damaging, and highly publicized failures in recent years attributable to its
institutional culture, management structure, and incompetence, not just to inadequate
resources. It is at least arguable that Congress should use its “power of the purse” to induce
bureaucratic reforms within the IRS. These points are developed below.
In 2013, controversy erupted about alleged IRS targeting of conservative and
libertarian groups for special, burdensome review of their applications for tax-exempt
status.97 Accusations, apologies, firings, and investigations occupied much of the news
cycles for years thereafter.98 Criminal charges have not been brought. Whether overt or
subtle political influences led to “targeting” of these groups is beyond the possibility of
conclusive proof or disproof.
But our interest should go deeper. Assume no criminality or partisan motivation
of any kind. We are still left with appalling incompetence by the IRS, both in the training
and supervision that caused poor handling of the applications and especially in the inept or
deceptive nature of the IRS responses to the investigations.99
Responsible persons on both sides of the political aisle accept this. Senator Orrin
Hatch, chair of the Senate of Finance Committee, finds in the scandal “gross
mismanagement at the highest levels of the IRS.”100 Senator Ron Wyden, ranking member
of that committee, concurred: “[T]he two of us [Senators Hatch and Wyden] certainly agree
that there is evidence of vast bureaucratic bumbling at the IRS.”101
As damaging as that saga was, it has had company. For example, in any
organization of size, some employees will violate the rules or even break the law. The IRS
cannot fairly be criticized for human failings of its employees. It can, however, properly
be taken to task for failing to properly discipline miscreant employees. Yet, “[i]n recent
years, the IRS has paid millions of dollars in bonuses and given tens of thousands of paid
vacation hours to employees with recently substantiated conduct issues and disciplinary
actions, including bonuses to 1,100 employees owing back taxes.”102 In addition, the IRS
has rehired hundreds of seasonal employees despite their prior misconduct, including
96

Seven Commissioners Letter, supra note 14, at 5-6.
See I.R.C. § 501(c)(4).
98
For detailed discussion of the controversy, see Leandra Lederman, IRS Reform: Politics as
Usual?, 7 COLUM. J. TAX L. 36 (2016).
99
“The agency’s performance during the Tea Party scandal has been defensive, dilatory, and less
than fully honest.” Joseph J. Thorndike, Stop Blaming the IRS for Problems It Didn’t Create, TAX NOTES, at
115 (July 14, 2014).
100
Quoted in Committee Press Release, Finance Committee Releases Bipartisan IRS Report 2
(Aug. 5, 2015) (on file with author).
101
Wyden Floor Statement on Finance Committee Investigation of IRS Handling of Applications
for Tax-Exempt Status, at 2 (Aug. 5, 2015) (on file with author).
102
Letter from Senator Orrin Hatch to John Koskinen (Jan. 29, 2015) (on file with author).
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willfully failing to file their own returns, gaining unauthorized access to taxpayer
information, falsifying official forms, and misusing IRS property.103
Other IRS failures have included:
•

Sending incorrect information to 800,000 taxpayers as to ACA,104

•

Multiple examples of waste in IRS conferences and training
programs,105

•

Paying millions to contractors who have failed to pay large tax debts
they owe to the federal government,106 and

Failing to effectively monitor claims for deductions and credits in
widely abused programs.107
The IRS sometimes is criticized unjustly, but “[i]n recent years, its list of failures
and transgressions is long and serious.”108 Commissioner Koskinen acknowledged that
“there has been a loss of confidence among taxpayers and particularly within Congress in
regard to the way we manage operations.”109
When an agency performs badly and the Administration fails to impose the
appropriate corrections, the most important tool available to Congress is the power of the
purse. It was in the exercise of that constitutional authority110 that Congress says it acted
to rein in IRS abuses.111
One may fairly ask whether Congress’ parsimony was proportional to the IRS’s
derelictions. The harms described in Part I may involve too much pain for too little gain.
•

103
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, Additional Consideration of Prior Conduct
and Performance Issues is Needed When Hiring Former Employees (Feb. 5, 2015).
104
See, e.g., Peter Sullivan & Sarah Ferris, Feds Sent Incorrect Tax Information to People on
ObamaCare, THE HILL (Feb. 20, 2015), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/233315-incorrect-taxinformation-sent-to-800000-people-on-obamacare [https://perma.cc/DA3B-PJHJ].
105
See, e.g., Prepared Remarks of Danny Werfel, Principal Deputy Commissioner, Before the 2013
IRS Nationwide Tax Forum, at 4 (July 30, 2013) (on file with author).
106
See, e.g., Stephen Dinan, IRS Breaking Federal Law in Paying Contracts to Tax Cheats: Audit,
WASH. TIMES (June 24, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jun/24/irs-breaks-federal-lawpaying-contracts-tax-cheats/?page=all [https://perma.cc/8EB5-7JTZ].
107
See, e.g., Hadley Malcolm, IRS Flubs $5.6B in Tax Credits, USA TODAY, May 6, 2015, at 5B
(reporting a Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration study finding that the IRS issued more than
$5.6 billion in faulty education tax credits to about 3.6 million taxpayers in 2013).
108
Thorndike, supra note 99, at 115; see also Dave Camp, former Chair of the House Ways and
Means Committee, quoted by William Hoffman, Koskinen Achieving Mixed Results So Far, TAX NOTES, at
233 (July 21, 2014) (“Since my time in Congress, I have never seen an IRS so broken.”)
109
Written Testimony of John A. Koskinen, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, Before the
House Oversight and Government Reform Comm. on IRS Operations 2 (Mar. 26, 2014).
110
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 & § 9, cl. 7; see, e.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 908
(1937).
111
[T]he IRS has exhibited a litany of questionable practices and expenses over the past
five years . . . .

[A]fter five years of budget cuts or freezes, I would hope that the IRS has turned
a new leaf . . . .
....
We deliberately lowered the IRS’ funding to a level to make them think twice
about what they were doing and why.
Ander Crenshaw, Chair, Subcomm. on Financial Services and General Government, House Comm. on
Appropriations, Opening Statement as Prepared, Oversight Hearing—Internal Revenue Service 2 (Feb. 25,
2015).

22

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW

[Vol.7:5

That question is hard to answer. The principle, however, stands. Control of the budget is
the traditional and most effective means available to Congress to punish agency failures
and to encourage improvements. In light of the IRS’s dubious recent performance,
surrender of this tool would be unwise. That being so, “just give the IRS whatever it wants
or needs” may be an obvious, but not necessarily a desirable, response to the current crisis.
III.
OTHER THEORETICALLY AVAILABLE SOLUTIONS
We saw in Part II that two “obvious” solutions—increased IRS efficiency and
appropriating more money without fixing the IRS’s bureaucratic problems—are not by
themselves reliable pathways out of the current morass. In this Part III, we consider other
approaches which may, as substitutes for or complements to the obvious approaches, move
our tax system forward.
One could float armadas on the oceans of ink that have been spent describing the
countless proposals that have been offered to improve the substantive and procedural rules
of federal taxation.112 Identifying, explaining, and evaluating the numerous suggestions
(meritorious and not) would be an encyclopedic effort, well beyond the limits of this article.
Here, it will suffice to note the families of alternatives and sketch the approaches that, by
design or happy accident, might ease the current crisis.
The families of proposals discussed below are (1) radical tax revision, that is,
replacing some or all existing federal taxes with other taxes, (2) eliminating or modifying
features of existing taxes, (3) moving non-revenue functions outside the IRS, (4)
harmonizing U.S. and foreign tax rules, (5) revamping tax lawmaking, (6) changing
incentives, and (7) relying more heavily on technology.
A.
Radical Tax Revision
Wholesale or partial replacement of the income tax or other current major federal
taxes is a perennial topic in tax discourse. Interest in the topic crests and falls in waves,
but the sea is never wholly still. Most suggested alternatives are one or another version of
a consumption tax, such as the value-added tax, progressive consumption tax, and some
versions of the so-called flat tax.113
It is hard to become extremely excited about the prospects for fundamental reform.
Anyone experienced in taxation has heard many times “this time, it’s really going to
happen!” But it almost never does, making it hard to join the parade when the next banner
of supposed inevitability sallies past.114
112

Some of the many possibilities are discussed in Jonathan Barry Forman & Roberta F. Mann,
Making the Internal Revenue Service Work, 17 FLA. TAX REV. 725 (2015) (enumerating both changes that
would require congressional action and administrative actions that could be taken by either Treasury or the
IRS without legislation, with the goal of designing a tax system administrable at even modest levels of
funding); Steve R. Johnson, Reforming Federal Tax Litigation: An Agenda, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 205
(2013) (detailing proposed changes as to tax trial and appellate structure and doctrine).
113
For a discussion of several such alternatives, see Alan Viard, Fundamental Tax Reform: A
Comparison of Three Options, TAXPROF BLOG (Jan. 25, 2016) http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2016
/02/viard-presents-fundamental-tax-reform-a-comparison-of-three-options-today-at-georgetown.html [https://
perma.cc/59TH-B9JZ].
114
From a distance, tax reform reflects the shimmering frontier of American
economic policy . . . .
Up close, however, the picture dims. For reasons both economic and political,
the idea of a fundamental overhaul that closes loopholes, lowers rates and simplifies the
tax code faces a deeply uncertain future regardless of who controls the White House and
Congress in 2017.
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The issues typically debated with respect to replacements for the income tax
involve progressivity, revenue-raising capacity, and effect on economic growth.
Presumably, the ultimate decision as to whether to embrace replacements will turn on those
considerations more than on their effect on administrability. However, administrability is
part of the debate.115
Would a consumption-based partial or complete alternative to the income tax
ameliorate the current crisis? In the short term, no. The enormous transitional challenges
of moving from one system to another would exacerbate immediate stresses.116 The longterm effect would depend on design choices. Our income tax does entail mind-numbing
complexity. In part, this is because “a neutral, scientific measure of taxable income is a
mirage. . . . [T]he income tax structure cannot be discovered, but must be constructed; it is
the final result of a multitude of debatable judgments.”117
But that would also be true of any alternative system. The choices made can
produce complexity regardless of the starting point. The current income tax is complicated
in part because of so called “tax expenditures,” in effect, subsidies to various persons or
activities necessitated by defining ability to pay.118 Similar pressures would likely find
outlets in any replacement system.119 For example, persons and activities could be favored
in a consumption tax through elaborate exemptions, different rates of tax, timing rules, and
rebate or credit mechanisms.
The current income tax also is complicated by the engrafting of consumption-based
features, such as deferring the imposition of tax on retirement savings.120 Indeed, what we
call our “income” tax actually is a mix of income-based and consumption-based provisions
in roughly equal measure.121 If an income tax can be hybridized, so can a consumption tax.
It all depends on design details, which can change over time.122 Nothing guarantees that a
fundamental alternative to the income tax would ultimately be easier to administer than the
present system.
B.
Feature Modification

John Harwood, Despite Pledges, Tax Reform Remains an Elusive Goal, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2016), http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/02/03/us/politics/despite-pledges-tax-reform-remains-an-elusive-goal.html [https://
perma.cc/3YU9-Y346].
115
For example, Michael Graetz has argued for partial replacement of the income tax by a value
added tax in order to eliminate the need for low- and middle-income taxpayers to prepare, and for the IRS to
process, 100 million tax returns each year. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS: A
SIMPLE, FAIR AND COMPETITIVE TAX PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES (2008).
116
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 1, at 124 (noting “the god-awful task of how to move from the old
system to the new”); Viard, supra note 113, at 33-45.
117
Boris I. Bittker, A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 925, 925, 985 (1967).
118
See generally Douglas A. Kahn, A Proposed Replacement of the Tax Expenditures Concept and
a Different Perspective on Accelerated Depreciation, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 143 (2013). Approximately one
quarter of the spending of the federal government consists of tax expenditures. National Taxpayer Advocate,
2 Annual Rep. to Congress, 2010, at 101-04 (Dec. 31, 2010). They exceed $1 trillion a year. Nina E. Olson,
More than a “Mere” Prepare: Loving and Return Preparation, TAX NOTES, at 767 (May 2, 2013).
119
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 1, at 118, 122.
120
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 219, 401-420.
121
See, e.g., William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1117 (1974); Lawrence A. Zelenak, Will the Federal Income Tax Have a Bicentennial?,
41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 275, 275 (2013).
122
Similarly, were Congress to enact a “flat” tax, one wonders how long it would remain flat.
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Simplifying tax burdens on the IRS might be too costly if doing so seriously eroded
other important tax values. However, numerous proposed changes to aspects of our current
tax system would arguably improve the substance of the law as well as facilitate
administration. Here are some candidates.
1.
Reduce the Number of Pass-Through Regimes
So-called C corporations are separate taxpayers from their shareholders, 123
creating the possibility of double taxation of corporate profits paid out to shareholders as
dividends. This can be avoided if the entity is formed instead as an S corporation or as a
partnership. Under Subchapters S and K of the Code, S corporations and partnerships
generally do not themselves pay tax on their profits but instead pass the tax through to the
shareholders or partners.124
Why do we need two pass-through regimes? There are situations in which S
corporations have advantages partnerships do not, and there are other situations in which
partnerships (including multi-member limited liability companies, which are usually taxed
as partnerships) have advantages over S corporations.125 Thus, eliminating one or the other
pass-through form (or melding the two forms) would be unpopular with the politically
potent small business sector.
Nonetheless, one may well ask whether the extra flexibility is important enough to
saddle the tax system with considerable costs in terms of administrability. Subchapter K
is hideously complex, indeed is often beyond the capacity of taxpayers to understand and
of the IRS to enforce.126 For that reason, I would abolish Subchapter K (in the main) and
keep Subchapter S.127
Some others would make the opposite choice—abolishing Subchapter S and
retaining Subchapter K.128 The absence of consensus is one factor propping up the current
regime of two pass-through systems. Whichever approach were taken, the tax system
would be improved by paring the number of pass-through regimes.
2.
Eliminate the Ordinary Income-Capital Gains Distinction
For individual taxpayers, long-term capital gains are usually treated favorably
compared to ordinary income. 129 For all taxpayers, capital losses are usually treated
unfavorably compared to ordinary losses.130 The advantages and disadvantages of treating
capital gains and losses differently from ordinary gains and losses have been debated for

123

See I.R.C. § 11.
I.R.C. §§ 701 (partnerships), 1363(a) (S corporations).
125
The choice-of-entity literature is vast. See, e.g., John W. Lee, Choice of Small Business Tax
Entity: Facts and Fictions, 87 TAX NOTES 417 (2000).
126
The distressingly complex and confusing nature of the provisions of Subchapter
K present a formidable obstacle to the comprehension of these provisions without the
expenditure of a disproportionate amount of time and effort even by one who is
sophisticated in tax matters with many years of experience in the tax field.
124

Foxman v. Comm’r, 41 T.C. 535, 551 n.9 (1964), aff’d, 352 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1965). In the half century
since the Tax Court penned this gloomy assessment, Subchapter K has become more, not less, impenetrable.
127
See Steve R. Johnson, The E.L. Wiegand Lecture: Administrability-Based Tax Simplifications, 4
NEV. L.J. 573, 589-96 (2004).
128
See, e.g., Walter D. Schwidetzky, Integrating Subchapters K and S—Just Do It, 62 TAX LAW.
749 (2009).
129
Compare I.R.C. § 1(h), with I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d).
130
See I.R.C. §§ 1211-12.
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generations,131 and different judgments have been made at different times. The distinction
did not exist in our tax law until 1921. In 1986, the distinction was repealed but was
reinstated a few years later. At other times, the requisite holding period for long-term
status, the size of the differential, and limiting rules all have varied. 132 My own
preference—a minority view133—would be to abolish the differential.
Capital gains policy is determined principally by considerations other than
administrability. But it is worth noting that, were we ever to bury the distinction and not
later exhume it, the burdens on the IRS would be greatly eased. The Code is festooned
with provisions that exist only to keep in some state of repair the fence between ordinary
and capital.134 These sections require regulations, revenue rulings, private letter rulings,
audits, and litigation. Abolition of the distinction would be a major move in obviating the
current crisis.
3.
Abolish the Accumulated Earnings Tax
The accumulated earning tax (AET) imposes a penalty tax on corporations that
accumulate profits beyond the reasonable needs of the business instead of paying them out
as dividends.135 Determining what constitutes such reasonable needs requires extensive
factual inquiry. At the end of the day, the IRS often loses because (1) the taxpayers have
superior access to the facts and (2) courts are often reluctant to second-guess the business
judgment of the taxpayer.136
As a result, it is likely that, on net, the IRS loses money when it tries to enforce the
AET, at least when opportunity costs are taken into consideration. The IRS often invests
hundreds of agent hours in AET examinations, appeals, and litigation, yet recovers little or
nothing.
Relevant statistics may not exist and, if they do, have not been publicly released.
It is likely, however, that the IRS’s assumed “$4 of extra tax collected for every $1 of extra
IRS budget” return on investment137 is not achieved in AET examinations. Instead, the
IRS should invest its time in other audit areas where that return on investment can be
achieved. The AET wastes the time of the IRS, and because of opportunity costs, it hurts
the federal fisc. Therefore, the AET should be abolished.138
4.
Revise Treatment of Tax-Exempt Entities
Certain organizations are generally exempt from the federal income tax. 139
“Originally, only two types of organizations—charities and fraternal benefit societies—
were exempt . . . . Today, there are more than 29 different types of tax-exempt entities in
section 501(c) alone and by some counts more than 70 in all.”140
131

See, e.g., WILLIAM D. POPKIN, INTRODUCTION TO TAXATION 45-49 (5th ed. 2008).
For this history in brief, see id. at 46-47.
133
But I have some illustrious company. See, e.g., Daniel Halperin, Commentary: A Capital Gains
Preference Is Not EVEN a Second-Best Solution, 84 TAX L. REV. 381 (1993); Edward J. McCaffery, The
Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1267, 1295-95; Joseph A. Snoe, Tax Simplification and
Fairness: Four Proposals for Fundamental Tax Reform, 60 ALB. L. REV. 61, 66-85 (1996).
134
Among scores, if not hundreds, of examples, see I.R.C. §§ 1211-1259.
135
I.R.C. §§ 531-537.
136
See, e.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933).
137
See supra text accompanying notes 83-86.
138
For a more detailed discussion, see Johnson, supra note 127, at 603-8.
139
See I.R.C. §§ 501-513.
140
David S. Miller, Reforming the Taxation of Exempt Organizations and Their Patrons, 67 TAX
LAW. 451, 451 (2014).
132
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The area is huge, and policing it places heavy burdens on the IRS.141 Yet the area
remains a trouble spot in tax administration. The very size of the enterprise is daunting;
key definitions sometimes are vague; 142 and there are recurring tensions between
enforcement and other important values, such as privacy, free expression of ideas and of
religion, and facilitation of socially useful work.143
Befitting the importance of the issues, a large literature has arisen. Numerous
proposals—some complementary, some not—have been offered, including narrowing the
categories of exemption, less rigorous oversight, more rigorous oversight, and increasing
the transparency of IRS regulation of the area.144 Where the needle stops in reform of this
area will have significant implications for the amelioration or exacerbation of the current
crisis.
5.
Other Proposals
Numerous other simplification proposals are advanced on a frequent basis.
Helpful sources include the following:
•

Academic commentary,145

•

“Blue ribbon” commission reports,146

•

Bar reports,147

•

Accounting society reports,148

•

The annual reports to Congress by the National Taxpayer Advocate,

•

The so-called Greenbooks issued by the Treasury explaining tax
changes in the Administration’s annual budget proposals,149

141

In 2013, there were nearly 1.5 million organizations recognized under § 501(c), and the IRS
devoted 842 full-time equivalent employees to the area. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, “The Better Part of Valour Is
Discretion”: Should the IRS Change or Surrender Its Oversight of Tax-Exempt Organizations?, 7 COLUM. J.
TAX L. 80, 84, 87 (2016).
142
See, e.g., ABA Retirement Funds v. United States, 759 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2014).
143
The scandal involving IRS review of § 501(c)(4) applications from conservative-leaning groups,
see supra text accompanying notes 97-101, reflects the sensitivity of these trade-offs.
144
See, e.g., Roger Colinvaux, Political Activity and Tax Exemption: A Gordian Knot, 34 VA. TAX
REV. 1 (2014); Mayer, supra note 141; Miller, supra note 140; Donald B. Tobin, The Internal Revenue
Service and a Crisis of Confidence: A New Regulatory Approach for a New Era, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 429
(2014); George K. Yin, Saving the IRS, 2014 TAX NOTES TODAY 87-5 (May 6, 2014).
145
See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Some Income Tax Simplification Proposals, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
71 (2013) (advancing over 50 suggestions).
146
See Report of the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair and ProGrowth: Proposals to Fix America’s Tax System (Nov. 2005); Report of the National Commission on Fiscal
Responsibility and Reform, The Moment of Truth (Dec. 1, 2010). Nothing came of these reports. Perhaps
this is unsurprising. Commissions usually are for kicking the can down the road, not for solving problems.
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 1, at 118 (“When a problem is too difficult to solve, punt to a commission”).
147
The American Bar Association Section of Tax, New York State Bar Tax Section, and other tax
professional organizations and individuals submit numerous proposals to Congress, the Treasury, and the
IRS. The government submissions of the ABA Tax Section are available at http://www.americanbar.org
/groups/taxation/policy.html [https://perma.cc/M73R-K3ML].
148
See, e.g., American Inst. of Certified Public Accountants Press Release, AICPA Sends Tax
Reform Suggestions Concerning Individuals to Senate Finance Committee Working Group (Mar. 19, 2015)
(on file with author).
149
See, e.g., Department of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year
2017 Revenue Proposals (2016).
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Occasional study reports by the President, Treasury, and IRS,150 and

• Congressional reports.151
C.
Moving Non-Revenue Functions Outside IRS
Subpart I.A.3. above noted that one aspect of the “terrible trifecta” is the
imposition on the IRS of the burdens of administering legions of initiatives that, although
lodged in the Code, have no essential connection with revenue collection.
A direct response would be to remove these initiatives from the purview of the
IRS, lodging them instead in agencies more natural to the programs in question. This may
not always be the right course. For instance, the Earned Income Tax Credit (“EITC”)152 is
one of the federal government’s largest anti-poverty programs.153 Because it is directed at
the working poor, who have received wages and have paid taxes, it may be that the easiest
way to administer the EITC is through tax returns, putting the program in the IRS’s court.
Nonetheless, the EITC is problematic from an administrative standpoint. Because
of the complexity of the EITC, there is a high error rate, including innocent error and
outright fraud. The IRS estimates that 24% of all EITC payments are made in error,
resulting in improper payments of between $124 billion and $148 billion between Fiscal
Year 2003 and 2013.154 The Code may be the best home for the EITC, but it is not a good
home.
The case for lodging other non-revenue initiatives in the Code may be weaker. As
noted in Subpart I.A.3., the ACA is creating immense strains on the IRS.155 There is no
programmatic logic under which the ACA is naturally linked to the Code. The shared
responsibility payment156 could have been structured as a penalty outside the Code.157 As
an alternative to fully shifting some non-revenue functions to other agencies, in some
instances, program administration might be improved by more cooperative interaction
between the IRS and other relevant agencies.158
Other concerns about IRS administration of the ACA also have been expressed. It
requires IRS employees to make decisions “unrelated to [their] traditional expertise and
skill set.”159 Moreover, “[f]or important and well-understood reasons, the IRS operates
with a great deal of independence from other agencies. . . . [D]irect participation of the
150

(1985).

151

See, e.g., President’s Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Simplicity, and Growth

See, e.g., House Comm. on Ways & Means, Tax Reform Act of 2014, Discussion Draft, Sectionby-Section Summary (2014).
152
I.R.C. § 32.
153
The EITC and the related Additional Child Tax Act engender refunds exceeding $90 billion a
year. Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, Existing Compliance Processes Will Not Reduce
the Billions of Dollars in Improper Earned Income Tax Credit and Additional Child Tax Credit Payments 5
(Sept. 29, 2014).
154
Id.
155
See also Staff Report, House Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, Making Sure
Targeting Never Happens: Getting Politics Out of the IRS and Other Solutions 14-16 (July 29, 2014).
156
I.R.C. § 5000A.
157
This fact is underlined by the odd rules governing enforcement of the shared responsibility
payment. Unlike normal tax provisions, the IRS is prohibited from asserting criminal penalties on account of
willful nonpayment of the shared responsibility payment and may not use liens or levies to collect it. I.R.C.
§ 5000A(g)(2).
158
Government Accountability Office, Low-Income Housing Tax Credit: Joint IRS-HUD
Administration Could Help Address Weaknesses in Oversight (July 2015).
159
National Taxpayer Advocate, 2010 Annual Rep. to Congress 20 (Dec. 31, 2010).
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Service in a major non-tax Administration initiative has the potential to erode the historic
independence of the Service.”160
Divesting the IRS of at least some of its non-revenue functions would liberate
resources for improved IRS administration of its core functions. Hopefully, this would
obviate unwise attempts to shift core duties out of the IRS. 2004 legislation authorized the
IRS to enter into contracts with private companies to collect assessed but unpaid taxes.161
The program was discontinued in 2009. Given the unimpressive results the first time
around, occasional calls to reinstate private tax collection at the federal level should be
disregarded.162
The proper role of the IRS in administering the ACA and other non-revenue
initiatives 163 entails many questions beyond the scope of this Article. However, the
possibility of shifting non-revenue initiatives outside the IRS requires serious discussion
as a response to the current crisis in tax administration.
D.
Harmonizing U.S. and Foreign Tax Rules
Historically, countries showed little enthusiasm for helping other countries enforce
their tax laws.164 However, in a relatively short span of time, attitudes have changed. The
world’s economically leading countries all realize that, by legal or illegal means, many of
their nationals are using transnational transactions to avoid or evade domestic tax liabilities.
Recognition of the common interest in preventing this evasion has led to increasing
international tax cooperation. Regular and ad hoc bilateral and multilateral contacts are
being established, and information exchange among revenue authorities grows apace.165
Therefore, the question naturally arises whether cooperation in enforcing national laws
should and will morph into some degree of harmonization of tax laws. To the extent their
laws are the same, countries will find cooperation easier and more fruitful.166
A prominent experiment along these lines is the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(BEPS) initiative of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, an
attempt to overcome divergences of national tax systems in order to better control transfer
pricing abuses by multinational enterprises. Formidable obstacles to such efforts exist,
including notions of national sovereignty and divergent national economic interests.167 In

160
Statement of Mark W. Everson, former Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, IRS:
Enforcing Obama Care’s New Rules and Taxes, hearing before House Comm. on Oversight and Government
Reform, 112th Cong. (2012).
161
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 881(e), 118 Stat. 1418, 1625
(2004).
162
See, e.g., National Taxpayer Advocate, 2013 Annual Rep. to Congress 97-99 (2013).
163
For example, the IRS’s administration of energy-related tax expenditures has not been especially
impressive and has imposed significant burdens on the IRS. See Forman & Mann, supra note 112, at 775-79.
164
One manifestation of this was the so-called revenue rule followed, in law or in fact, in most
countries. See, e.g., Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 360-68 (2005).
165
Some of these efforts are described by Koskinen, supra note 44, at 5-7.
166
For an ambitious move in this direction, see Henry Ordower, Utopian Visions Toward a Grand
Unified Global Income Tax, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 361 (2013).
167
For a description of the BEPS project and barriers to its success, see Ali Qassim, Analysts:
BEPS Project Won’t Work Without U.S., 34 TAX MGMT. WKLY. REP. 1042 (Aug. 17, 2015); see also Mindy
Herzfeld, A Quick Overview of the BEPS Project, TAX NOTES, June 2, 2014, at 987.
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a survey of 2500 businesses in 38 countries, only 23% of respondents thought that BEPS
will be successfully implemented.168 Others are more optimistic.169
International legal harmonization, even if it ultimately gains momentum, will take
too long and will be too piecemeal to provide immediate help with the current crisis.
However, in the long term, it will be interesting to see whether converging international
tax administration interests trump or yield to diverging national economic and political
interests.
E.
Revamping Tax Lawmaking
Congress in writing Code sections and Treasury in writing regulations sometimes
cling to habits that, over time, compromise efficient tax administration. Numerous
examples could be adduced. Here are some possible changes to achieve attitudinal or
structural correction of the processes of writing tax rules.
1.
Choosing Feasibility over Theoretical Perfection
Often, the rule maker—whether it be Congress writing a tax statute or Treasury
writing a tax regulation—must choose between two competing conceptions of the
enterprise. One approach is to create so detailed and nuanced a rule that, if it is accurately
understood by taxpayers and the IRS, will fully and precisely capture the balancing of
interests chosen by the decision maker. The second approach is to write a simpler rule that
is a bit less nuanced and precise but is more readily understandable by taxpayers, their
advisers, and the IRS.
Congress and the Treasury sometimes choose the former approach and other times
choose the latter.170 In my view, Congress and the Treasury too often choose the former.
The assumption behind this choice seems to be that the way something is written inside the
Washington beltway is the way it is applied by taxpayers, their representatives, and IRS
field agents outside the Beltway. This assumption is a flight from reality. In many
instances, the complexity of the rule as written defies the comprehension and the ability to
implement of mere mortals. When that happens, taxpayers make the best guess they can.
This best guess may not accord with the best guess of IRS agents, leading to unnecessary
and wasteful administrative appeals and litigation.
Consider three examples, all drawn from Subchapter K, governing income taxation
of partnerships and their partners. First, when a person renders services to a partnership
and receives a profits-only interest in the partnership as compensation, does that person
have an immediate inclusion into income? This issue has generated confusion—inside the
government as well as outside it—for decades. In one case, the IRS asserted additional tax
in such a case on a particular theory and won in the Tax Court. Defending against the
ensuing appeal, the Department of Justice conceded that the theory that had prevailed in
the Tax Court was erroneous but defended the result on a different theory. The circuit court
rejected that new theory and held for the taxpayer.171
168
See Qassim, supra note 167 (reporting on a survey by Grant Thornton); see also Jeremy Scott,
BEPS Project Faces Rough Future in Congress, TAX NOTES, June 9, 2014, at 1063; Lee A. Sheppard, The
BEPS Hybrid Draft and the Euro, TAX NOTES, June 9, 2014, at 1085.
169
See Qassim, supra note 167 (BEPS “is a thoughtful and impressive response” to “overcoming
divergence of tax systems” and “shows international tax cooperation at its best.”) (quoting British tax
consultant Stephen Fiamma).
170
As examples of the latter approach (less precise but more understandable), see I.R.C. §§ 63(c),
102(c), and 152(e), all discussed by Johnson, supra note 127, at 584-88.
171
Campbell v. Comm’r, 59 T.C.M. 236 (1990), rev’d, 943 F.2d 815, 818 (8th Cir. 1991).
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Second, when a partner engages in transactions with her partnership, the tax
treatment depends on which characterization under Code section 707 applies. In one case,
the IRS prevailed in the Tax Court on the basis of the particular categorization it argued
for.172 However, in a later revenue ruling involving similar facts, the IRS held that that
categorization—the one the IRS had persuaded the Tax Court to accept—is wrong.173
Third, when liquidating payments are made to a retired partner or the estate of a
deceased partner, the tax treatment depends on the characterization under section 736.
According to the Tax Court, to dispel “any lingering doubt [about] the distressingly
complex and confusing nature of . . . Subchapter K . . . one has only to reread section 736
in its entirety.”174
Congress and the Treasury would materially ease the IRS’s burdens in
administering the tax laws by more frequently giving up a mote of nuance, of theoretical
perfection in the statute or regulation in favor of a rule that taxpayers and IRS agents can
more readily understand and apply.175 “[T]he most ingenious tax policy proposal really
isn’t worth very much if it cannot be successfully administered by the IRS.”176
2.
Improving the Legislative Process
Our traditional conception is that “[t]axation is a legislative function, and [at the
federal level] Congress . . . is the sole organ for levying taxes.”177 Not surprisingly, there
is no end of criticism of how Congress has performed this function.178
The literature is not wanting for suggestions for how Congress can improve this
performance. By way of example and not necessarily of endorsement, Professors Forman
and Mann propose (1) creating a permanent loophole-closing commission and (2) requiring
Congress to provide greater detail in tax statutes, instead of delegating the task to the
Treasury for regulation-writing.179 These and other proposals are not uncontroversial. For
example, Professors Hines and Logue propose that Congress delegate more, not less, of the
tax lawmaking power to Treasury.180
F.
Changing Incentives
Ends can be achieved by commands supported by coercive power. Or they can be
achieved through attitudinal changes, by aligning incentives and perceptions so that selfinterest and the public interest walk together. Below are some proposals of the latter type
that might be useful in easing the current crisis.
1.
Attitudes of Taxpayers
Numerous aspects of current American tax administration make life harder on
taxpayers than is warranted by the resulting benefit to the government. Among the bolder
172

1977).

173

Pratt v. Comm’r, 64 T.C. 203 (1975), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 550 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir.

Rev. Rul. 81-300, 1981-2 C.B. 143, 144.
Foxman v. Comm’r, 41 T.C. 535, 551 n. 9 (1964), aff’d, 352 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1965).
175
See Johnson, supra note 127, at 582-88; see also Forman & Mann, supra note 112, at 803-04
(urging the Treasury to issue simplifying regulations).
176
George K. Yin, The Most Critical Issue Facing Tax Administration Today—And What To Do
About It 1 (June 27, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2459592 [https://perma.cc/AP53-AW69].
177
Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340 (1974); see U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 1.
178
See, e.g., Michael Doran, Tax Legislation in the Contemporary U.S. Congress, 67 TAX L. REV.
555 (2014).
179
Forman & Mann, supra note 112, at 789-92.
180
James R. Hines, Jr. & Kyle D. Logue, Delegating Tax, 114 MICH. L. REV. 235 (2015).
174
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possible changes is “presumptive taxation.” Under this approach, a taxpayer’s liability
would be computed not on actual income but on various “easily verifiable external factors”
that would serve as proxies for income.181 For instance, “a tax on some percentage of a
business’s gross receipts or its asset values rather than a precise measure of income might
be considered a rough proxy for a business income tax.”182
The approach could be employed as the legally conclusive measurement, or the
result of its use could establish a rebuttable presumption, allowing taxpayers to prove actual
taxable income to overcome the proxy-based presumption.183 If used only presumptively,
the expectation is that many taxpayers would simply go along with the proxy result, as a
way to avoid the expense and annoyance of maintaining records and preparing returns.184
Another approach would be moving to a “return free” system. Under it, at least
some taxpayers—such as those whose income is captured fully by withholding on wages
reported on Form W-2—could have their liabilities computed by the IRS from the reported
sources.185 The effort of that calculation by the IRS likely would be offset by savings in
avoiding the need to process the now unnecessary returns.
Penalty reform also could be guided by putative effects on policy. Some have
argued that current penalties are badly designed both in amount and in application, with
the result that they do not encourage, and may even undercut, taxpayer compliance.186 In
addition, the reasonable cause defense to tax penalties187 may encourage taxpayers to take
aggressive tax return positions, relying on dubious advice from lawyers or accountants to
deflect possible penalties. The defense may need to be adjusted to curb this possibility.188
2.
Attitudes of Third Parties
Knowledgeable third parties can be important allies for the IRS. This already is
reflected in the tax “whistleblower” initiative,189 which, after a slow start, appears to be
growing.190 In a somewhat parallel vein, commentators have proposed authorizing qui tam
suits in tax matters,191 creating a climate in which tax advisers will discourage taxpayers
from participating in tax shelters,192 and applying pressure against aggressive tax planning
181
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and reporting by removing privacy protections from some corporate tax return
information.193 Similarly, the IRS’s attempt to bring unregulated tax return preparers “in
from the cold” first by an invalidated mandatory regulation 194 and now by a voluntary
(incentivized) program 195 attempts to adjust the knowledge and the motivation of such
preparers to prepare and file accurate returns.
3.
Attitudes of IRS
It is hard to change institutional culture. However, as a small silver lining in a
large dark cloud, the substantial personnel turnover the IRS has been experiencing196 may
facilitate this change. “Responsive tax administration” focuses on “regulatory tools and
approaches designed to move beyond a one-size-fits-all framework [hopefully to] gain
voluntary compliance by regulated parties.”197 A large literature on it already exists.198
Especially in the current environment, the big objection, of course, is that limited
resources are incompatible with tailored, contextualized treatment of taxpayers. Some
scholars have addressed this concern, offering approaches to allow better targeting without
the cost of case-by-case discretionary enforcement.199
G.
Greater Use of Technology
Technology, of course, is already central to tax administration. Two of the pillars
of the current income tax are withholding 200 and third-party information reporting. 201
“Technological improvements have made [these] more efficient, which has allowed these
mechanisms to become more pervasively used.” 202 Technology links to other possible
avenues, described above, of response to the current crisis. For example, the BEPS
project203 “should consider automating the exchange of country-by-country reporting data
to avoid overburdening tax administrators with the task of evaluating thousands of
individual requests per year.”204
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The IRS believes that technological innovation is central to the future of tax
administration.205 In particular, it is looking to “big data” analytics to improve IRS services
in a range of areas,206 and even more innovative applications may become possible.207
But a snake or two may lurk even in a new technology-driven Garden of Eden.
First, of course, the heavier the reliance on technology, the greater the harms if that
technology is compromised. Achieving and maintaining a first-class maintenance and
security apparatus will be essential.
Second, technology must be kept the servant and not allowed to become the master.
The goal must be to use the capabilities to allow the IRS to better adapt to taxpayers—in
all their variety—not to demand that taxpayers take on uniform shape most congenial to
systems design and parameters. The poor and powerless too often are not present in, and
are ignored by, conversations about tax reform.208
The IRS has assured us of its intention to, “[t]hrough the use of sophisticated
analytics, . . . uncover insights that will allow us to better serve underserved
populations.”209 However, the IRS also says that “[t]axpayer expectations and behaviors
indicate a preference towards online self-service.”210 No doubt many taxpayers have such
a preference. But not all do. For various reasons, some do not want, or want but cannot
obtain, modern computing capability, and some will actually want to talk with a real, live
person. Hopefully, the IRS will not use the preferences of some to relegate others to tax
service oblivion.211
IV.
REALITIES AND NEW REALITIES
Part III sketched general directions and some specific proposals that might, if
properly designed, ease the crisis created by the perfect storm intersection of flat or
declining IRS budgets, growing IRS revenue-related workloads, and foisting upon the IRS
major responsibilities not essentially connected to the IRS’s revenue-collection function.
In the context of particular possibilities, Part III noted relevant political considerations.
We now turn to political realities on a more general plane, considering them from
three perspectives: (1) acknowledging the reality of perverse political incentives, (2) noting
205
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that, given the impermanence of everything political, today’s reality may be tomorrow’s
memory, and (3) in light of the above, suggesting an appropriate role for those interested
in the solvency of tax administration in the United States now and in the future.
A.
Realities
Everywhere and always, public policy is driven in part by the public interest and
in part by personal interest (what is sometimes called “public choice”).212 It is of course
true that ideas with much public interest merit fail because of public choice perversities.213
Examples abound.
Congress often “strings out” desirable changes rather than
implementing a whole agenda at one time because doing so is a way to raise PAC
contributions over many years, not just one.
Part of Congress’ recent hostility to the IRS may well be based on principle,214 but
the unscrupulous have incentive to keep the issue alive rather than solve it. Inadequate IRS
technology and training budgets guarantee future IRS “screw-ups,” and each such event is
the chance for media exposure, new fund-raising letters, and guaranteed applause lines in
stump speeches.
Nearly everyone speaks urgently of the need to simplify our tax laws.215 But “[t]ax
simplification has no constituency.”216 When a lawyer or politician is put to the choice of
supporting (1) a simple tax rule that does nothing for, or even hurts, a client or important
constituent or (2) a complicated rule that is very much in the client’s or constituent’s
pocketbook interest, the “smart money” knows where to place its bet.217
And, of course, self-interest does not stop at the water’s edge. BEPS faces and
future international tax harmonization initiatives will face great pressure from parochial,
national interests.218
B.
“Realities”
Only an incorrigible optimist would ignore the preceding barriers to the making
and maintaining of good tax policy. But only an incorrigible defeatist—and one with little
knowledge of tax history—would assume that obstacles are forever. Political forces are
always in motion, so political realities are always temporary. Even enduring tendencies
can be swamped, if only for a brief window of opportunity, but the march of events.
Consider some examples:
•

The “bracket creep” phenomenon (tax bills rising because of the effects of
inflation) offered real benefits to politicians: (1) rising revenues not
requiring voting for tax increases and (2) the chance to be a hero to the
voters by periodically voting for tax cuts only partly offsetting bracket
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creep. And yet bracket creep was banished from the Code a generation
ago and has not returned.219
•

Politicians benefit (in the form of campaign contributions) from annually
renewing annually popular tax breaks. Yet Congress recently voted to
make some renewals permanent.220

The value-added tax was once considered political poison. Yet many
Presidential candidates—Republican Presidential candidates—now are
proposing them.221
C.
What To Do
Many a fair flower of reform has been crushed under the hard heels of selfish
interest and callous indifference. But there is personal satisfaction in fighting the good
fight, even if it is against long odds.222 And the good does sometimes triumph despite the
odds. If major reform is unlikely, piecemeal gains can be won.223
Those who are friends of good tax administration might find the following course
realistic without being fatalistic: (1) continue to advocate for good ideas, creating an
intellectual record that can justify change at the opportune moment; (2) when the winds of
public choice opposition blow hard, husband energy and avoid discouragement; (3) when
the gale subsides or when political circumstances direct the wind in favorable direction,
seize the moment to push hard for the changes already justified intellectually; and (4)
compromise but not to the point of sacrificing core principles of taxation.
What are those principles? Many sets have been offered. Professor, later Judge,
Sneed’s seven principles of taxation are always worth remembering. 224 Other
commentators have offered different or more particularized lists. 225 So have political
leaders of both parties.226 The IRS has established a ten-part Taxpayer Bill of Rights.227
Regardless of the stresses of the moment, even those as acute as the current
“perfect storm,” tax discourse and action should always trench firmly in solid principles.
To endure, to flourish over the long term, so pervasive and crucial a function as financing
the government must rest on principles, not expediency. Despite the crisis, we should
eschew anything momentarily seductive that would imperil the enduringly sound.
•
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